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The Forms and Ecologies of Islamist militancy and terrorism in Bangladesh 
 





Islamist militancy and terrorism, a major sociopolitical issue of Bangladesh today, has largely 
remained under-researched. This paper mainly explores the forms and ecologies of Islamist 
militancy and terrorism based on the content analysis of media reports and interviews with 
some experts in Bangladesh. Ecologies, in this paper, refer to the multiple interrelated and 
interdependent environments: social, political, and religious, that foster, germinate and 
nurture the growth of militancy and terrorism.  Despite Bangladesh being globally identified 
as a moderate Muslim country located in South Asia, Islamist radicalization, extremism and 
militancy have become a major concern since the incidence of nationwide serial bomb blasts 
in 2005. Although an estimation of the group operatives may not be possible because these 
groups change names or members change groups from time to time, the presence of seventy 
Islamist militant outfits with thousands of militant members was identified during 1999-2010. 
Islamist militants carried out over 203 attacks killing 164 innocent people and injuring more 
than 2,658 people in this period. Using bomb explosions, these attacks targeted political 
parties, cultural groups, intellectuals, diplomats, movie theatres, NGO offices, and minority 
religious institutions. In response to these attacks, the government has adopted mostly a law-
enforcement centric approach, but this study suggests a comprehensive strategy balancing 
enforcement, intervention and prevention urgently needed for de-radicalization and 
counterterrorism in Bangladesh --- the 8th most populous country and the 3rd largest Muslim 
country of the world. Although foreign journalistic and intelligence-based reports have argued 
that Islamist militants have links with madrassas (Islamic seminary institutions), this system 
has actually been in vogue for many years in the country. Research suggests that 
unemployment problems, poverty, illiteracy, and ignorance about religious matters among the 
youths are the common drivers for Islamist militancy in Bangladesh. An unfocused national 
educational policy on madrassas, the narrow and dated madrassa curriculum, and frustrations 
felt by madrassa graduates who cannot find jobs are likely to instigate the madrassa students 
to get involved in militancy. Political, educational, and religious interventions are must for 
countering radicalization effectively. Improving education policy and creating employment 
opportunities for the unemployed youth can begin to address the problem of Islamist 
militancy and terrorism in Bangladesh. 
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Introduction 
Terrorism is one of the extreme forms of crime, since it involves serious violence 
against civilians. Since the 1990s, terrorism has become a hot topic for research because of 
national and transnational security concerns. Immediately after the 9/11 US attack, the 
international media presented Bangladesh as a new hub of terrorism after Pakistan and 
Afghanistan. However, Islamist militancy has become a serious law and order issue after the 
nationwide serial bomb blasts in August 2005 (Rahman, & Kashem, 2011). Bangladesh has 
not been the site of any major terror attacks afterwards, and has not been listed as a terror risk 
country, although religious militancy has remained as a deeply rooted problem.  This is 
evidenced by the sporadic militant attacks by Islamist outfits in the country despite the 
government’s strict anti-terrorism position since 2006. From 2013, the media, police, 
government, and international actors have expressed concerns over the issue of Islamist 
militancy and terrorism given the rise of serious attacks on bloggers, publishers, university 
professors, foreigners, and members of minority religious groups. Because of these incidents, 
the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) indicates the rise in the score from an historic low of 4.1 in 
2012 to 5.47 in 2013 to 5.92 in 2014, and ‘vulnerable to high terrorism risk in an early 2015 
assessment (Riaz, 2016a).  
The rise of Islamist militancy and terrorism in Southeast Asia, South Asia, Middle 
East, and Africa was linked to various historical and politico-religious factors including the 
direct and indirect presence of al-Qaeda and homegrown militant groups (Millard, 2004; 
Abuza, 2003; Gunaratna, 2003 Hamilton-Hart, 2005; Wright-Neville, 2004). Since the 1990s, 
these regions have witnessed the rapid expansion of Islamic political organizations with the 
goal to establish an Islamic state and rule. In the post-9/11 era, the United States (US) 
extended the war on terrorism and has been supporting governments in these regions for 
counterterrorism operations. State based terrorism, killing innocent civilians in the name of 
war on terrorism, is associated with the problem of militancy and terrorist violence in 
Southeast Asian countries and has increased anger against the US and local governments 
(Hamilton-Hart, 2005).  Religious teachings and brainwashing that deviate from mainstream 
Islam, radicalize and motivate people to resort to militancy and terrorism (Hamilton-Hart, 
2005). Islamist groups are violent and anti-US, more activists are likely to become militants 
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Militancy and terrorism, terms which are often synonymously used today, are not new 
to either Bangladesh or other South Asian countries such as Pakistan, India, Bhutan, Nepal, 
Myanmar and Sri Lanka. The words radical, extremist, militant and terrorist are used 
interchangeably as well (Abuza, 2003 as cited in Hamilton-Hart, 2005). There are several 
other terms such as insurgency, extremism and militia, which often have similar meanings or 
usages. Various religious, ethno-national and political rebel outfits, militant groups or 
insurgent groups have been operating in these countries and many of these groups are 
interlinked as well (Riaz, 2008; Quamruzzaman, 2010; Datta, 2007; BIPSS, 2010; Rahman, & 
Kashem, 2011; South Asia Terrorism Portal, 2016; Site Intelligence Group, 2016). 
Located in South Asia, Bangladesh is the 8th most populous country and the 3rd largest 
Muslim country in the world. With only 147,570 sq. km of land area, Bangladesh is home for 
over 160 million people (BBS, 2016). As per the 2011 population census, women constitute 
almost half of the population. The literacy rate is 51.8 percent (BBS, 2011). Almost half of 
the population is young (under age 18), and the ethnic population comprises 1.10 percent of 
the total population (BBS, 2011). Religion-wise, 88.8 percent of the total population is 
Muslim, and the rest comprises of Hindus, Christians, and Buddhists (BBS, 2012). 
Bangladesh has traditionally been reputed to be an inclusive, secular, and tolerant society with 
sustained communal harmony among Muslims, Hindus, Christians, Buddhists, and other 
communities despite being a Muslim-majority country (El-Said, & Harrigan, 2011). 
Bangladesh became an independent nation state in 1971. It has a history of having 
being ruled for hundreds of years by foreign powers—Brahmin kings, Buddhist kings, 
Muslim sultans/emperors, British viceroys, and Pakistani rulers. The 1947 British Partition of 
India into two states (India and Pakistan) was based on religion. Indian Muslims established 
Pakistan in 1947 through a long socio-religious/cultural struggle against the dominant Hindu 
elites and British rule (Hossain, 2015). The Pakistani state was created with two territories --- 
West Pakistan, and East Pakistan (the present Bangladesh) detached by 2,400 km of Indian 
Territory. Within the framework of Islamic State of Pakistan, the Awami League (AL) fought 
for the regional autonomy of East Pakistan, and in response to the military crackdown of 
Pakistan, the people of Bangladesh engaged in a war of independence in 1971 (Hossain, 
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Ganges and the Brahmaputra. Bangladesh is surrounded by India on three sides, and the Bay 
of Bengal and Myanmar to the south. 
Bangladesh adopted its 1972 Constitution based upon four state principles --- Bengali 
nationalism, secularism, socialism, and democracy. The first president of the newly 
independent war-torn Bangladesh, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, instituted a presidential 
democracy. But, less than four years after independence, Bangladesh suffered a military coup 
and the assassination of the father and president of the nation. Military and quasi-military 
governments of Major Ziaur Rahman and General Hussan Mohammad Ershad, who later 
formed Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and JP (Jatiya Party) respectively, governed the 
country for over a decade. In 1991, Bangladesh returned to a parliamentary democracy. Two 
major political parties --- Bangladesh Awami League (AL) and Bangladesh Nationalist Party 
(BNP) led governments over last two decades. BNP founder Ziaur Rahman’s wife Khaleda 
Zia led the BNP and ran governments with allies of religion-based parties including JIB 
(Jamat-e-Islami Bangladsh) and IOJ (Islami Oikko Jote) two times from 1991-1996, and the 
again from 2001-2006, and the father of the nation Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s daughter 
Sheikh Hasina led AL and formed governments with allies of left wing parties three times 
from1996-2001; 2009-2014, and 2014-present. Around the 2006 national election, two parties 
clashed and the ruling party BNP manipulated the caretaker government (CTG) system that 
had served as a model for fair and free election in the country. Because of the political rivalry 
between these two parties, the military intervened in the nation’s political affairs, and the 
election was delayed until 2008. The military-backed caretaker government (CTG) took place 
during the period of 2007-2008.  
With a huge mandate, the Awami League (AL) came into power in December 2008 
with an anti-militancy promise in its election manifesto. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina was 
very serious about the issue of militancy and terrorism, and adopted a zero-tolerance policy to 
militancy. Due to the government’s counterterrorism (CT) measures along with the political 
stability, Bangladesh has not witnessed any serious militant attacks during 2009-2012, until 
facing devastating political violence in 2013-2014. This violence was incited by two political 
issues: first the verdicts of the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) that followed in the wake 
of Shahbagh Movement and was joined by a mass of people including bloggers, free thinking 
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major opposition party's demand that the 2014 national election be under the non-party care 
taker government. Another political showdown in 2012 was by Hefazat-e-Islam, madrasa 
students and their teachers, who wanted to protect Islam from anti-Islamic policies adopted by 
the AL government and to protest against anti-Islamic writing by atheist bloggers and other 
anti-Islamic elements. Several of these political events and political violence incorporated 
religious elements. JIB’s violence was against the ICT verdicts to war criminals. Behind the 
political violence around the election issue, the BNP and the JIB were involved in arson, 
killings and damages to properties in 2013 and 2014 to oust the government. However, the 
AL government handled the situation using force and political engineering which resulted in 
holding the election without BNP’s participation (Rahman, 2015). Since 2014, the BNP has 
not been able to organize any strong political programs. JIB and its student wing ICS have 
been under the government’s judicial action through the ICT to ban the JIB as a political party 
for its role in the liberation war in 1971.  
Bangladesh has witnessed left-wing extremism and ethnic militancy since its 
independence in 1971. The presence of Islamist terrorist outfits and groups can be traced back 
to the 1990s. Islamist extremism and militant activities rose dramatically from 1999 to 2005. 
No Islamist militant attack was reported during 2006-2012 due to the government’s hard 
approach and the political stability (Riaz, 2016a). But from February 2013- June 11, 2016, 
over 50 terror attacks took place and killed more than 50 people (Table 1). These recent 
militant attacks indicate the need for effective preventive approaches. Otherwise, the rise of 
Islamist radicalization and violent extremism can pose a serious threat to the political 
stability, security, and development of Bangladesh.  
This paper argues that Islamic radicalization is linked to various forms and ecologies 
of Islamist militancy and terrorism, and law-enforcement measures alone cannot prevent 
Islamist militancy and extremism in Bangladesh. An integrated and comprehensive counter-
radicalization strategy balancing enforcement, intervention and prevention, taking into 
consideration of various socioeconomic, political and cultural factors, is needed.  
This paper begins with a brief description of the methods and data sources used for the 
study; it then presents the trends, types, and groups of Islamist militancy and terrorism, and it 









ISSN: 2363-9849         
radicalization associated with the threat of Islamist violent extremism and militancy in 
Bangladesh. 
 
Methods and Data Sources 
 
The study mainly used content analysis of secondary sources (media reports, books, 
magazines, research reports and internet publications) and interviews with Bangladeshi 
experts. A study titled “Understanding religious militancy and terrorism in Bangladesh” was 
conducted by the author of this paper along with another researcher in 2010-2011 to explore 
the extent and nature of various Islamist militant groups and their terrorist activities, and the 
underlying factors of militancy, the funding sources, and the strategies and techniques used by 
terrorist groups in Bangladesh (Rahman, & Kashem, 2011). Two widely circulated 
newspapers (one in Bengali, and one in English) – the Ittefaq and the Daily Star respectively – 
issued between 2001 and 2010 were used for content analysis. Two others - the Daily 
Prothom Alo (Bengali) and the New Age (English) along with other Internet sources were 
used to supplement the data. The same newspapers were used for updating the recent terrorist 
attacks in Bangladesh. Eight experts representing law enforcement practitioners, security 
research organizations, human rights organizations, academics and civil society members 
were interviewed for the study. An interview guideline was used to gather information from 
the respondents.  
 
Trends, Types, and Actors of Islamist Militancy and Terrorism in Bangladesh 
 
The Presence of Islamist Militancy 
 
Islamist radicalization, extremism, militancy, and violent political rhetoric have gained 
accelerated currency in Bangladesh politics in recent years. The presence of militant groups 
has been reported in Bangladesh since mid-1990s (BIPSS, 2010; Riaz, 2008, 2016, 2016a; 
Quamruzzaman, 2010; Datta, 2007; Rahman, & Kashem, 2011; BEI, 2015). The media, 









ISSN: 2363-9849         
problem of Islamist militancy and terrorism in Bangladesh before the 2000's (Rahman, & 
Kashem, 2011).  
Since the US declared global war on terrorism after the 9/11 events, various foreign 
media, think tanks, and intelligence reports have expressed their international concerns 
claiming that Bangladesh has been becoming a regional terrorist hub linked with al-Qaeda or 
pro-bin Laden Jihadi terrorism that will turn it into another Afghanistan (Harrison, 2006; 
Vaughn, 2007; Rahman, 2004; Quamruzzaman, 2010; Institute for Defence Studies and 
Analysis 2009; Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 2003).  
The Bangladeshi governments have always denied the presence of militancy in the 
country, and blamed opposition parties for terrorist incidents in their respective regimes. The 
Awami League (AL) government (1996-2001) faced several militant attacks, and linked these 
attacks to the opposition Jamat-e-Islami Bangladesh (JIB) and its student wing Islami Chatra 
Shibir (ICS). The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) government (2001-2006) initially 
denied the presence of militancy, and blamed the opposition AL for terrorist incidents during 
its regime. But it shifted its position from denial to acceptance of the militancy problem after 
the 2005 nation-wide bomb blast and international pressures.  
The Awami League government took a stern position against militancy and terrorism 
since 2009. During their two terms (2009-2014; 2014-present), they adopted a zero-tolerance 
policy. The recent rise of militant attacks and killings, and the political blaming of BNP and 
JIB for these attacks, as well as the government’s denial of the presence of or links to 
international terror groups indicate that the rising problem of Islamist violent extremism and 
militancy has become a serious threat to political stability, security, and development of the 
country.  
Nature of Militant Attacks 
 
Table 1 shows the major attacks carried out by Islamist militants from 1999 to 2016 
(as of June 11). After the countrywide showdown of force and strength by two Islamist 
militant organizations – JMB (Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh), and JMJB (Jagrata 
Muslima Janata Bangladesh) in 2005, there were no serious terrorist incidents reported during 
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Terrorism Portal, 2016). The content analysis of media reports showed that the Islamist 
militants carried over 203 attacks, killing 164 innocent people and injuring more than 2658 
people during the period 1999-2010 (Rahman, & Kashem, 2011). From 2005 to 2010, 25 
terrorists were killed. The JMB alone reportedly carried out over 100 operations. These 
attacks mostly involved bomb and grenade explosions.  
 
Table: 1. Major Islamist Militant Attacks and Persons Killed (1999 – 2016) 
Year Number of Incidents Number of People Killed 
1999 3 18 
2000 1 2 
2001 5 24 
2002 10 27 
2003 2 9 
2004 9 37 
2005 32 36 
2006 18 03 
2007 7 0 
2008 6 0 
2009 8 0 
2010 5 3 
1999-2010 92 136 
2013 7 5 
2015 26 30 
2016  14 (June 11) 19 
2013-2016 47 54 
1999-2016 139 190 
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Most of these militant attacks during 1999-2010 targeted the rallies of political parties 
(Awami League, Communist Party of Bangladesh, cultural groups (Udichi, Shatadal), cultural 
celebrations and fairs (New Year, fair, jatra (folk song), circus, international trade fair), urs 
(death anniversaries of saints), Ahmadia mosques, churches, intellectuals, diplomats, movie 
theatres and NGO offices. The recent militant attacks are analogous to pre-2006 militant 
attacks in terms of targets including secular bloggers, writers, publishers, university 
professors, cultural activists, Hindu priest, Shi’ite preacher, Buddhist monk, Christian 
convert, Hindu businessman, LGBT magazine editor and activist, foreign-born priest, foreign 
nationals, and Ahmadi and Shi’ite mosques (The Prothom Alo, May 1, 2016; The Daily Star, 
May 22, 2016; The Daily Star, May 4, 2016; SITE Intelligence Group, 2016). In very recent 
times militants targeted and killed opponents clandestinely using knifes, guns and sharp 
weapons (stabbing and hacking to death). In 2015, one militant committed a suicide attack in 
a mosque. 
 
Number of Militant Organizations 
The exact number of militant groups or outfits in Bangladesh cannot be ascertained. 
According to an expert interviewee, this estimation is difficult because of the numerous 
definitions of terrorism. A key informant we interviewed pointed to a list including 112 
militant groups while another list included 125 from another source (Table 2). Many of these 
outfits frequently change names or reorganize under different names (Table 3).  Because of 
this here cannot be any reliable or accurate list of these groups for example, JMB (Jaamatul 
Mujaheddin Bangladesh) changed to JMJB (Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh), HUJI 
(Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami) to Chital (form of jihad), which later merged to JMB, and another 
new group named Islam o Muslim has emerged (See Table 3 for the major groups with their 
acronyms). According to the expert interviewee, this constant changing of names is not only 
used by militant groups in Bangladesh but also in Pakistan, e.g., Laskar e Taiyeba (LeT), and 
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Table: 2. Number of Islamist Militant/Extremist Groups in Bangladesh 
Number Source Remarks 
18 – 50 Khan (2007), Barakat (2005), 
Qamruzzaman (2011) 
Individual researchers 
12+ Ahsan (2005) Journalist 
70 Rahman & Kashem (2011) Institutional researchers 
33 Bangladesh Awami League (AL) in 
2005 
Political party 
12 AL Government in 2009 Government 
33 Intelligence reports in 2009 State security agencies 
Source: Adapted from Rahman & Kashem (2011) supplemented with the published 
journals and Internet publications 
The number of militant groups varies across sources such as official, political party, 
research studies, and newspapers (Table 2). The number of active militant groups ranges from 
dozens (Ahsan, 2005), through 30 (Khan, 2007) to 50 (Barakat, 2005). Quamruzzaman (2011) 
identified 18 such Islamist militia groups including two political parties (JIB, IOJ) and one 
student organization of JIB (ICS). In 2005, the then opposition party Awami League (AL) 
identified 33 Islamic militant groups. On March 16, 2009, the AL Government identified 12 
militant outfits – the JMB, HUJI-B, HT, Ulema Anjuman al Bainat, Hizb-ut Tahrir (HuT), 
Islami Democratic Party (IDP), Islami Samaj, Touhid Trust, JMJB (Jagrata Muslima Janata 
Bangladesh), Shahadat-e al Hikma Party Bangladesh, Tamira Ar-Din Bangladesh (Hizb e Abu 
Omar), and Allahr Dal (Table 3). The Bangladeshi security agencies identified 33 militant 
groups in 2009 (South Asia Terrorism Portal, 2009).  
From media reports alone, 70 militant outfits were identified (Rahman, & Kashem, 
2011). Both homegrown and foreign-linked groups have been active in Bangladesh for a long 
time (Riaz, 2016, 2016a; BEI, 2015). Bangladeshi militant organizations were found to have 
links with some foreign nationals who were linked with Pakistan based Laskar e Taiyeba 
(LeT), and India based Hizbul Mujahedee (HM) (BIPSS, 2010; ICM, 2011; BEI, 2015). 
Bangladeshi militants sheltered some of these foreigners, and they even employed them in 
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Trends of Development of Islamist Militant Organizations  
 
This paper finds two major developments in Islamist radicalization and militancy in 
Bangladesh. The pre-2006 history of militancy was more driven by homegrown militant 
outfits led by Afghan War veterans. These groups mostly targeted members of madrassas, as 
well as rural, poor and unemployed youth in poverty-prone districts of the country. The 
Islamist radical groups in the post 2013 era were more influenced by global jihadist 
movements including the al-Qaeda and ISIS. The young people from non-madrassa 
institutions (universities, colleges) with middle class and urban backgrounds have leaned 
towards joining these groups.  
The Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI) identified two waves of radicalization 
among Islamist militants in Bangladesh. Based on their transformations, tactics and 
objectives, Riaz (2016a) identified five generations of Islamist militants in Bangladesh. The 
first wave of radicalization occurred during 1999-2005 following the returns of Afghan war 
veterans in the 1990s and the generation of militant groups like Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami 
(HUJI), Jaamatul Mujaheddin Bangladesh (JMB), and Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh 
(JMJB). The second wave of radicalization is linked to the technologically advanced extremist 
groups like Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HuT), Hizbut Tawhid (HT), and Ansar Ullah Bagla Teach (ABT), 
who have been propagating the ‘global jihadist ideology in the local language’ (BEI, 2015).  
The Afghan War (1979-1992) produced the first generation of militants. Since 1984, 
3,000 volunteers joined the war in several batches. Between 1988 and 1992, a returnee 
established contact with Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI) - a Pakistani Islamist organization 
and later founded the Bangladesh chapter - HUJI-Bangladesh (HUJIB). Most of the HUJI-B 
leaders were older, madrassah (particularly Deobandi) educated, and hailed from rural areas 
(Riaz, 2016a).  
The second generation of militants is linked with the formation of a new group called 
Jaamatul Mujaheddin Bangladesh (JMB) by Shaikh Abdur Rahman, son of a deceased Ahle 
Hadith leader, and Asadullah Ghalib, leader of the Ahle Hadith Andolon Bangladesh (AHAB, 
Ahle Hadith Movement Bangladesh) (Riaz, 2016b). The JMB was formed to transform 
Bangladesh as an Islamic State. Youth educated in technical and vocational training colleges, 
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operations from the northern and northwestern parts of the country adopting the name 
‘Fighting in the way of Allah’ (Qital fi Sabilililah). Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh 
(JMJB), an affiliate of JMB, was led by Shaikh Abdur Rahman and Siddiqur Rahman, alias 
Bangla Bhai was (Riaz, 2016a).  
The third generation of militants was born with the foundation of the Bangladesh 
chapter of Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HuT) in 2011 - a new organization with international connections 
by a university professor and a Commonwealth Scholar trained in the United Kingdom (Riaz, 
2016a). Its members included middle class urban-based and technically skilled university 
students.  
The fourth generation of militants is associated with another new group named the 
Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT). It can be traced to 2007 under the name of Jamaat-ul 
Muslemin. The ABT came to limelight in March 2013 with funding from external source 
(Riaz, 2016a). But it started its recruitment from 2012 largely through cyberspace. The ABT 
is now renamed Ansar al Islam. The ABT is a young generation of jihadists who use multiple 
languages (Bengali, Urdu, Arabic and English) to communicate their messages. They initially 
used an Al Qaeda affiliated website - the ‘Ansar al Mujahideen English Forum’ (AAMEF), 
and later moved to another Pakistan-launched - ‘bab-ul-islam.net’ (Riaz, 2016a). The Ansar 
al-Islam is mentioned as the Bangladesh division of al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent 
(IQIS) (Site Intelligence Group, 2016). According to the ISIL’s media Dabiq, IS has 
established contacts with the banned JMB (Riaz, 2016). ABT claimed responsibility for the 
killing of bloggers in 2013 in the wake of Shahbagh movement around the verdicts of the 
International War Crimes Tribunal (The daily Star, May 4, 2016; Riaz, 2016; Ahsan, 2016). 
The fifth generation of militants include the members and followers of the AQIS and 
the IS) who have founded their own local organizations to pursue their objective of 
establishing an Islamic state in Bangladesh and participate in the global militant Islamist 
movements being inspired by, and linked to, the transnational terrorist groups (Riaz, 2016a). 
The most recent groups - the Shaheed Hamza Brigade (SHB) and the Bangladesh Jihad Group 
(BJG) are the fifth generation militants. The police identified these groups in 2015.  
Due to the government’s counterterrorism (CT) measures along with the political 
stability during 2006-2012, the JMB, JMJB, and HUJIB militants have been weakened and 
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al Islam, or the Islamic State (IS)/Islamic State (ISIS)/Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 
(ISIL) has claimed responsibility for most of the recent attacks and brutal killings of 
professors/bloggers/ foreigners, and members of minority groups in the last one and half year. 
The police have claimed that the suspected militants involved with the recent killings are from 
home-grown JMB and ABT (Table 3). The government has denied the presence of IS or any 
other international terror groups, while at the same time claiming to have arrested ISIL 
recruiters in the recent  years to demonstrate  it is fighting terrorism (Aljajeera TV, 2016; Site 
Intelligence Group, 2016; The Prothom Alo, May 1, 2016).  














Established in 1992, banned in October 2005.  
Establish Islamic rule through jihad, Fight in Kashmir, freed from the 
aggression and influence of the west and east 
Transnational, reported to have links with al-Qaeda and some militia 
groups in Pakistan, Publish and distribute books, 6 camps in Cox`s 
Bazar hilly areas, reported to have links with piracy, smuggling and 
gunrunning. Rohinga refugees are also members, recruit from madrassa 
financed by Arab charities 
Another blacklisted outfit - Tamir ud Deen was formed in 1999 by a 
HUJI leader Mufti Abdur Rouf, and as alleged to have transnational 
Islamist networks  







Established in 1994 
Transnational, reported to have strong links with the movements 
network in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, funding from Hayatul Igaccha, 
Saudi Arabia and Society for the Renaissance of Islamic Legacy, Kuwait 
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 training from JMB training centers and Pakistani madrassas 




Established in 1994, banned  
Establish Islamic khalifate through jihad 
Founded by Mohammad Bayezid Khan Ponni who placed himself just 
behind the prophets, and authored a book banned in 1998, activists use 
iron hammer and tobacco dust to attack  
4 Shahadat al 
Hiqma 
Established in 1996, banned on February 9, 2003 
An armed group arose from Islami Chatra Shibit (ICS), Founder Syed 
Kawsar Hossain Siddiqui; Publishes leaflets; Connections with 5 
Islamist groups; Contacts with Kashmir based LeT, Get arms training 
from Nepal based Maoist organizations, and Dubai based Daud Ibrahim 
gave funds 








Established in 1998, banned on February 23, 2005 
Establish Islamic rule, and end anti-Islamic forces and practices in the 
country 
Local, but has transnational connections 
Received BNP-JIB patronization (2001-2006),  
Founder Sheikh Abdur Rahman, and AHAB Chief Dr. Asadulla Al 
Galib as one policy maker 
Most front liners trained in Afghanistan 








Established in 1998, banned on February 23, 2005 
Aimed to end activities of leftwing extremist in north west east, 
establish Islamic rule 
Follower of Taliban ideology 
Came into limelight on April 1, 2004 to unlawfully free the country 
from Maoist, 9 organizational divisions, supported and patronized by a 
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Masses of 
Bangladesh) 
and seminaries, carried out 100+ operations 




Emerged in 2000, banned on October 22, 2009,  
Originated in 1953 in Jerusalem,  
Aimed to establish caliphate state under a Caliph through invitation and 
jihad, 
Recruitments targeted university students, distribute inflammatory 
leaflets,  
Raised funds in the UK and within Bangladesh;  
Founded by Dr. Nasimul Gani and Shahnewaj and Dhaka University 
professor Golam Mowla, and the Chief Mohiuddin, a Dhaka University 
Institute of Business Administration professor 






Established in 2001 
Aimed to establish Islamic rule 
Former Jamat-e-Islmi (JI B) leader Moulana Abdul jabber formed, 
splitting from JIB preceded with Islami Samaj. Threat the prime minister 
to declare Bangladesh as Islamic state otherwise oust the government 




Established in 2008, blacklisted  
Aimed to Establish Islamic Sharihah law 
Transnational Islamist networks 
Founded by Afghan war veterans 
10 Tamir ud 
Deen 
Established in 1999, blacklisted 
Aimed to establish Islamic Shariah law  
Founded by a HUJI leader Mufti Abdur Rouf 
Alleged to have transnational Islamist networks 
11 Allar Dal Banned 
Aimed to establish Islamic rule through jihad  
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Use coercion to recruit, use CDs, booklets and leaflets etc. 
Founded by 2 former ICS activists – Matinul Islam and Babul Ansar, 










Renamed as  
Ansar al 
Islam 
Came to limelight in 2013, but it can be traced back in 2007, banned in 
2015 
Mainly aimed to silence or eliminate the critics of extremist religious 
doctrines 
 Propagating the global jihadist ideology  
It claims to be connected to al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) 
It has claimed responsibility for recent killings 
Islamic State (IS) considers it their Bangladesh chapter 
It has claimed responsibility for many of the recent killings as per SITE 
Intelligence Group Website 
The present government denies the presence of IS or al-Qaeda linked 
group in the country 
The government denies the presence of al-Qaeda linked group in the 
country 
Source: Adapted from Rahman & Kashem (2011), Quamruzzaman (2011), BIPSS (2011), 
SATP (www.satp.org), and supplemented by news reports from The Daily Star (2001-2016); 
The Daily Ittefaq (2001-2016) 
 Militant groups have grown over the years enhancing their strengths in terms of 
manpower and skills, and widespread networks to conduct terror campaigns. Some militant 
outfits have overlap in terms of training, operations, leadership, resource mobilization and 
agenda. JMB (Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh), and JMJB (Jagrata Muslima Janata 
Bangladesh) are often considered twins, and many others changed names when the 
government banned the mother organization (Table 3). Many of these organizations are 
connected to each other like JMB, JMJB, HUJIB (Harkatul Jiahad al Islami Bangladesh). The 
JMB (Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh) used the HUJI-B (Harkatul Jiahad al Islami 
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JMB (Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh), JMJB (Jagrata Muslima Janata 
Bangladesh), HUJI-B (Harkatul Jiahad al Islami Bangladesh), AHAB (Ahle Hadith Andolon 
Bangladesh), HuT (Hizbut Tahrir) and HT (Hizb-ut Towhid) were the major terrorist groups 
identified by Rahman and Kahsem (2011). The Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT), or Ansar Al 
Islam, which claims to be connected to the al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), was 
not in that list as it came to light in 2013 and claimed to be involved in the recent killings 
(Rahman, & Kashem, 2011; Riaz, 2016, 2016a; BEI, 2015). Thousands of people joined these 
militant groups in Bangladesh (Table 3). The JMB had almost one million members (full-time 
and part-time), the HUJI-B had more than 25,000 activists, and the JMJB had over 30,000 
militants (Rahman, & Kashem, 2011). These militant outfits and their leaders were linked to 
financiers from several countries including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, India, Pakistan and 
Afghanistan to which they had travelled. 
Religious outfits had links with non-religious insurgent groups within and outside the 
country such as the RSO (Rohinga Solidarity Organization - Myanmar), Maoist extremists of 
Nepal and Indian insurgent groups – United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA). Intelligence 
and media reports indicate that the RSO and Rohingya refugees in Cox’s Bazar, and the 
Indian North East ethnic insurgent groups including the ULFA were involved in arms 
smuggling. The RSO was an arms supplier of JMB and HUJI-B. The Rohingya (the Muslim 
minority ethnic group of Arakan State in Myanmar) refugees are also vulnerable to Islamist 
radicalization given their socioeconomic deprivations in refugee camps in Bangladesh. Many 
of them were linked with or targeted by Islamist extremist groups (Rahman, & Kashem, 2011; 
The Daily Star, June 11, 2016; Mannan, 2016).  
The Islamist militants have diverse socio-demographic characteristics, although the 
extant literature has a lacuna on the profile of Bangladeshi Islamist militants as well as the 
sources of motivation and the drivers of the radicalization process (Rahman, & Kashem, 
2011; Riaz, 2016a). According to the content analysis of media reports (Rahman, & Kashem, 
2011), out of 1,033 militants arrested during 2003-2010, the majority of the militants were 
from JMB (542 members), followed by HuT (20 members), HT (87 members), and Allahr Dal 
(68 members). A recent study based on the arrest data of alleged militants gathered from press 
reports published in the three major dailies in 2014 and 2015 showed that the majority of the 
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Shaheed Hamza Brigade (SHB), the ABT, the HUJIB, and the Bangladesh Jihad Group (BJG) 
(Riaz, 2016a). According to the news reports, the militants were mostly male, young, and 
employed in various sectors such as garment, transport, street vendors, or security workers, as 
well as professionals such as engineers, teachers, Imams, business, information technology, or 
criminals, primarily arms dealers, and finally students, mostly from madrassas (Riaz, 2016a). 
Most of the student arrestees were at the university level (have passed at least grade 12). 
Other than students and manual laborers, most of the arrestees were from middle-class or 
upper class backgrounds, and many of them had education in local including Cadet Colleges 
and universities and foreign institutions (Riaz, 2016a). These findings suggest that there are 
many other drivers than the traditional factors such as poverty, unemployment, and madrassa 
education that contribute to radicalization and extremism. The issue of Islamist militancy and 
terrorism is related to various factors --- domestic, regional, international, historical, political, 
economic and cultural (Rahman, & Kashem, 2011). 
The government’s main approach to Islamist militancy and terrorism centered on law 
enforcement. However, the arrest of Islamist militants and banning some militant outfits has 
been continued as the most visible law enforcement measure since 1998 (Rahman, & Kashem, 
2011). The law-enforcement-centered hard approach cannot alone solve the deeply rooted 
militancy problem in the country. To understand and respond to the rise of Islamist militancy 
and terrorism, the underlying root causes of violent extremism and radicalization need to be 
addressed with a combined strategy of enforcement and prevention as discussed later in this 
paper. 
 
Factors and Underlying Issues associated with Islamist Militancy, and their Implications 
for Counter-Radicalization in Bangladesh 
 
Islamist militancy and terrorism is a complex and multidimensional problem for 
Bangladesh since no single explanation can be applied to understanding the roots of Islamist 
militancy and terrorism there. Riaz (2008) views Islamist militancy as caused by the complex 
web of domestic, regional and international events and dynamics in Bangladesh. Riaz (2008) 
argues that Islamist militancy is the result of both errors of omission (the state, politicians and 
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of commission (the state, politicians, and the civil society did things that worsened the 
situation). The rise of religious militancy and terrorism is linked to various factors, such as 
domestic, regional and international (Riaz, 2008); historical-political (Quamruzzaman, 2011); 
madrassa, political patronage (Datta, 2007); and political, economic and cultural factors 
(Momen, & Begum, 2005). 
Most of the existing academic studies, and journalistic and intelligence reports do not 
view the problem of militancy, insurgency and terrorism from the historical-political contexts 
of Bangladesh (Quamruzzaman, 2010, 2011; Riaz, 2008; Momen, & Begum, 2005). Many 
foreign scholars and media reports link the issue with the upsurge of Islamist political parties, 
madrassa education, political patronage, and Taliban/al-Qaida presence (Datta, 2007; 
Harrison, 2006; Vaughn, 2007; Rahman, 2004; Quamruzzaman, 2010; Institute for Defence 
Studies and Analysis, 2009; Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 2003). Quamruzzaman 
(2010) identified poverty and resource deprivation, economic dislocation and social 
disorganization, political blame game and patronization, and easy access to arms and 
ideological apparatuses as the major factors of militia motivation in Bangladesh. According to 
some expert interviewees, actions of western countries, particularly the US that are anti-
Islamic in their maltreatment and attack on Muslim countries, motivate anti-American and 
anti-Israeli sentiment for these groups to commit terrorist acts. 
The growing number of Islamist militants, networks and their activities along with the 
incidents of terrorist attacks since 1999 indicate that Bangladesh is very vulnerable to Islamist 
extremism and militancy. Fundamentalism, extremism and radicalization hide under the 
disguise of religion in Bangladesh.  This paper is concerned primarily with two internal key 
factors --- domestic politics, and youth issues that are associated with educational, religious, 
cultural, or other contexts of Islamist radicalization and militancy, and must be effectively 
addressed to save Bangladesh from the rise of Islamist militancy and terrorism. 
Political Issues 
A number of external and historical political factors cause Islamist militancy and 
terrorism, yet the domestic political environment is the key factor. Since 1991, the 
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have followed a policy of denial that militant groups and outfits exist in Bangladesh. The 
denial policy and political blaming between these two major political parties on the issue of 
Islamist militancy and terrorism create favourable space for the rise of militancy. In the midst 
of the post-2013 militant attacks, the government and security agencies claimed that Islamist 
militancy was under control and they had successfully reduced militancy through their anti-
terrorism measures.  These measures included the banning of militant outfits, the surveillance 
of terrorist financing, and the arrest and execution of militants. The government has 
backtracked and covered-up its failure to curb militancy and terrorism (Riaz, 2016).  
Islamist militants have grown in the midst of the political environment. Because of the 
confrontational politics by the two major parties – BNP and AL from the late 1980s, Islamist 
groups have envisioned an Islamist Bangladesh (Riaz, 2008). Both ruling and opposition 
parties have exercised political blaming, and the governments have neglected the threat of 
Islamist extremist and militancy. During the BNP-led alliance government (2001-2006), 
religious extremism and militant activities rose despite their denial of its existence. But under 
international pressure in the midst of several county-wide terrorist incidents perpetrated by 
terrorist groups such as Bangla Bhai, the BNP took bold law enforcement measures to fight 
Islamist militancy, banning militant outfits, and punishing militants. The AL-led government 
faced several militant attacks during its earlier tenure (1996-2001), but its response was 
denying and blaming the opposition not addressing the root causes. The immediate past (2009 
- 2014) and the current (2014 - present) AL-led governments have adopted a zero-tolerance 
strategy toward militancy and terrorism.  
The political environment must be conducive to the practice of participatory 
democracy for the success of anti-militancy programs. In a political vacuum, extremist groups 
and militants are taking advantage of the situation.  Examples of how the present ruling party 
has blamed the opposition political parties are: - BNP (Bangladesh Nationalist Party) and JIB 
(Jamat-e-Islami Bangladesh) for the militant attacks and killings in recent years (Rahman, 
2015; Riaz, 2016; The Daily Star June 11, 2016; The Prothom Alo, June 12, 2016). The BNP 
claimed that without the government’s signal, such brutal killings or attacks would not be 
possible (The Daily Star, June 10, 2016). The BNP government has blamed the then 
opposition AL in a similar fashion. During the period of political stability (2006-2012), the 
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and proscribing militant groups. But during the political violence during 2013-2014 and the 
favorable political environment caused by the political vacuum with no major opposition 
parties in the parliament, Bangladesh has witnessed the rise of militant groups like the JMB 
(Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh), the Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT), and even the 
Islamic State (IS), which have claimed the responsibility for most of the recent attacks.  
At the backdrop of a dramatic increase in militant attacks and killings in May-June 
2016, the police suddenly launched a week-long anti-militancy drive to catch suspected 
militants.  The police arrested 5,324 people in the first two days out of seven-day anti-
militancy crackdown (The Daily Star, June 13, 2016; The Daily Prothom Alo, June 13, 2016) 
Only 85 arrestees were suspected militants. The remainders were suspected criminals of other 
crimes including drug dealing, and firearms. This mass arrest has raised concerns of human 
rights violations, i.e., by arresting innocent persons including members of opposition parties, 
the extrajudicial execution and killing of suspected militants in gun fight/encounters, the 
suppression of opposition parties, as seen when its leaders were arrested under false 
politically driven charges, and through police corruption and abuse of power by victimizing 
innocent people for bribes. (The Daily Star, June 13, 2016; The Prothom Alo, June 13, 2016). 
Such anti-militancy drives must not be driven by a political-agenda. They should not be used 
to suppress political dissents and opponents.  Such drives should catch the real killers based 
on evidence, and not let them hide, or re-organize for further attacks. Such drives must not 
violate human rights including the High Court directives regarding Article 54 (arrest without 
warrant). 
The police have already been widely criticized for not adopting fair procedures in 
arresting, investigating crimes, interrogating criminals, collecting evidence, and reporting 
cases to the courts (Rahman, & Hossain, 2014; Rahman, 2010). According to an academic 
expert, many police officers involved in criminal investigation do not know how to 
investigate, or how to complete a charge sheet, or final report, or effectively manage crime 
scenes due to inadequate training and education, and a lack of professionalism (Rahman, & 
Hossain, 2014). Police officers can easily manipulate investigations by exploiting the 
weaknesses of existing laws. The police are also under the influence of politicians, the 
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The use of anti-terrorism and other laws for political gains have raised human rights 
violation issues during different regimes (Rahman, & Kashem, 2011). The use of 
counterterrorism strategies against dissents and opponents for political gains has ultimately 
facilitated such groups to grow. The government’s associating JIB (Jamat-e-Islami 
Bangladesh, JMB (Jama’tul Mujahideen Bangldesh) and al-Qaeda together and pushing the 
legitimate opposition into their corner helped fringe militant groups proliferate (Riaz, 2016). 
The current government has adopted a heavy-handed approach using the ICT (Information 
and Communication Technology) Act to arrest people for allegedly hurting religious 
sentiments or posting online criticism of the government (Riaz, 2016). Local and international 
human rights bodies have long pointed out these human rights violations and intolerance of 
freedom of expression. This kind of political environment contributes to the rise of 
radicalization.  
Politicians should be tolerant and they must not facilitate a political environment that 
is conducive to the rise of extremism and militancy. In recent years, the use of extremist 
language by politicians, secularists or the Islamists is growing in Bangladesh. The political 
rhetoric has shifted dramatically from moderate to violent and intolerant. The political 
blaming between Al and BNP, that the other is responsible for militancy, and the political 
neglect of the threat of militancy due to this paralyzing rivalry has led to the weakened of an 
already fragile democratic political culture suffering under the pressure of domestic political 
issues allowing Islamist militancy and terrorism to rise in Bangladesh. 
The politicization of Islam and the use of religion to gain votes is another political 
factor associated with the rise of Islamist militancy in Bangladesh. The BNP and the JP often 
used the general public sentiment to bring Islamist elements into politics. The major political 
parties including the AL do not want to affect their political support by removing religious 
elements from the political culture. The Awami League (AL) included Jamaat e Islami 
Bangladesh (JIB) in their alliance to oust the BNP government in 1996. Islamist forces often 
misinterpret Islam to convince the ignorant and religiously sensitive people to support religion 
based political parties such as JIB, and Islami Oikyo Jote (IOJ). Some religion-based political 
parties mislead illiterate people in the name of Islam. Riaz (2008) categorized Islamists into 
three groups --- mainstream JIB, Tariqat Foundation, and Zaker Party (who participate in 
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Hisbut-Tahrir (HuT) who operate within democratic polity despite reservations; and militant 
Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), Jagrata Muslima Janata Bangladesh (JMJB), 
Harkatul Jiahad al Islami Bangladesh (HUJI-B), Hizb-ut-Tawhid, Shahdat-i-Hiqma, and 
Jaish-e-Muhammad (Table 3). According to some key informant interviewees, some political 
parties such as JIB and IOJ, and some student wings such as ICS (Islami Chatro Shibir) are 
militant organizations.  
The use of militants for political purposes is a very alarming issue. Some politicians 
have patronized or supported militants and extremists at different times (Rahman, & Kashem, 
2011). During the BNP-led alliance government, political patronization was blamed for the 
rise of militancy, extremism and radicalization (Rahman, & Kashem, 2011). According to 
some experts, many political leaders of the three major political parties – Bangladesh 
Nationalist Party (BNP), Jamat-e-Islami Bangladesh (JIB) and Islami Oikyo Jote (IOJ) have 
links with terrorist groups (Rahman & Kashem, 2011). If the political parties do not use 
religion for political gains, they can make a difference. According to key informant interviews 
(KIIs), the general public do not support any kind of terrorism and terrorist activities, but 
some political parties use religion to win elections or for other political gain. In fact, many 
political scientists, scholars and politicians argue that the current confrontational political 
environment is favorable to the rise of violent extremism and violence in Bangladesh. 
Youth Issues 
Another concern lies with the young people who become engaged in militancy and 
terrorism. Poverty-driven areas (southern and northern districts) and vulnerable young 
population groups (unemployed youths among refugee camps, madrassa students and poor 
people) were found to be most likely associated with the rise of religious extremism, 
radicalization and militancy (Rahman, & Kashem, 2011; BEI, 2011, 2014, 2015). 
Unemployment problem, poverty, illiteracy and ignorance about religious matters (rules and 
regulations and laws relating to Islam) are the underlying factors and causes of Islamist 
militancy and radicalization in Bangladesh (Rahman, & Kashem, 2011; BEI, 2015. In recent 
years, Islamists and radicals targeted middle class, educated, and young people (Riaz, 2016a; 
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coming from northern districts, are deprived of social and economic development. Many 
young people are brainwashed and motivated to join these groups for material gains (job 
opportunities). The role of transnational Islamic charity organizations in preaching and 
brainwashing distorted Islamic teachings in their funded madrassas and social organizations, 
and the presence of transnational Islamist political organizations like HUJI (Harkatul Jihad) 
and HuT (Hizbut–ut-Tahrir) bringing radical Islamist ideology are responsible for expanding 
international Islamist militant networks in the country (Quamruzzaman, 2010). Some NGOs 
were engaged in extremist activities, and some NGOs were involved in supporting militants to 
raise funds for training (Rahman, & Kashem, 2011; BEI, 2014). Bangladeshi militants 
received funds from individuals and charity organizations based in the Gulf countries, USA, 
UK and EU, through both hundi (informal money transfer) and formal banks that remained 
undetected (Rahman, & Kashem, 2011).  
The profile of recent arrestees showed that the militants were male, young, educated, 
and middle-class and affluent backgrounds (Riaz, 2016a). The police arrested five students 
from a top ranked private university called North South University in connection with the 
killing of a blogger named Ahmed Rajib Haider on 2nd March 2013. These young people are 
from affluent families as education in private universities is very expensive. They belonged to 
the extremist organization Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT), and confessed their crime in front 
of a magistrate (The bdnews24.com, March 10, 2013). This scenario indicates that young 
people in non-Islamic educational institutions (outside madrassa) are vulnerable to Islamic 
radicalization and extremism in Bangladesh also. 
There has been a huge debate about whether madrassa education is linked to the rise of 
Islamist radicalization and militancy in the country. The view of some key informants is that 
the Madrassa (Islamic seminary) education system can be associated with militancy while 
others strongly denied the linkage between madrassa education and militancy (Rahman, & 
Kashem, 2011). According to the majority of the experts, the Madrassa style education system 
has been in vogue for thousands of years in the Indian Subcontinent, and terrorism or 
militancy did not appear until the 2000's. Quamruzzaman (2010) refuted the allegation against 
madrassas and pointed out that the major causes of radicalization include widespread poverty, 
huge youth population and unemployment, confused religious identify, unregulated money 
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of Islam. It is true that some Bangladeshi madrassa students joined the Afghan jihad and got 
involved in militant groups upon their return, using some madrassas as training camps for 
radicalization. This is because the unfocused educational policy makes them frustrated after 
completing madrassa education. The traditional madrassa curriculum focuses on religious 
education, and does not include modern subjects like science, maths, etc. The labor market 
finds that madrassa students lack knowledge, skills and competence compared to non-
madrassa students. Besides, the Quami madrassa education is not integrated to the mainstream 
education system. Thousands of these are beyond the state regulation for the syllabus, 
pedagogy, and teacher recruitment.  
Many of these youth issues can be explained by the common causes or explanations of 
terrorism in other countries such as strains including poverty, material deprivation, and 
unemployment (Agnew, 2010), using Islam as an emotive force by political parties (Wrights-
Neville, 2004), and deviant religious teachings and brainwashing and the anti-Islam treatment 
such as propaganda against Islam and Muslim countries and labeling Muslims as terrorists by 
the US and Israel (Hamilton-Hart, 2005; Wrights-Neville, 2004). Harrigan (2011) attached the 
brutality and atrocity against Muslims in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kashmir along with 
the returning radicalized Afghan war veterans, political neglect of the threat of violent 
extremism, poor governance, and widespread corruption as contributing factors to the rise of 
Islamic radicalization and violent extremism in Bangladesh. 
In order to address the problem of radicalization, Muslim-majority states have 
undertaken various approaches, strategies, and processes (El-Said, & Harrigan, 2011). These 
included counter-radicalization strategies (Morocco, Bangladesh), de-radicalization strategies 
(Yemen, Egypt), well-structured official programs (Saudi Arabia), individual initiatives 
(Jordan), and collective de-radicalization (e.g., inside or outside prison) in Egypt (Islamic 
Jihad in 1997, and Jihad Organization in 2007) and Algeria (Algerian Salvation Army in 
1997). According to El-Said, and Harrigan (2011), important factors for the success of de-
radicalization programs are the role of political leadership, families, civil society, quality of 
clerics and scholars, the political and developmental strength of the state, and finally the 
relationship between national counter-radicalization and de-radicalization efforts on the one 
hand, and external factors and interventions on the other. They emphasized that counter-









ISSN: 2363-9849         
history, and rules and regulations of each country. 
Expressing zero tolerance against the twin problem of militancy and terrorism, Prime 
Minister Sheikh Hasina and the Awami League (AL) government announced a three-phase 
program ----- short, medium and long terms coming to power in 2009. The government 
formed a 17-member high profile committee called the National Committee on Militancy 
Resistance and Prevention to mobilize public opinion against terrorist activities. The 
government promulgated anti-terrorism and money-laundering laws, and banned 14 terror 
outfits in 2009. It ordered law enforcement and intelligence agencies, NGO Affairs Bureau, 
and the Bangladesh Bank to investigate terrorist financing (through banking or other channels 
like charity financing) or the engagement in militancy by finding out militants’ patrons, 
financiers and sources of illegal arms and ammunition. Local administrations—Deputy 
Commissioners, Upazila Nirbahi Officers and police, lawmakers and heads of the educational 
institutions were advised for holding meetings for effective campaign in their respective areas 
to uproot extremists from the society.  On April 1, 2010, the Government planned to deploy 6 
million Ansar (voluntary paramilitary force) and VDP (Village Defense Party) members to 
combat militancy. The Deputy Commissioners (DCs) would be training the members of Ansar 
who in turn would engage people at the grassroots and union levels (lowest local government 
tier) to fight against the militancy (The New Age, October 6, 2010). 
The education ministry initiated an anti-militancy campaign in schools by publishing 
and distributing booklets and leaflets against militancy and terrorism (Rahman & Kashem, 
2011). The Islamic Foundation Bangladesh under the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA) 
undertook another anti-militancy campaign through training imams and religious leaders on 
anti-militancy so that they could communicate the accurate interpretations of Islam among the 
followers in mosques, especially after the Jumma (Friday) prayers and persuaded the people 
that militancy is anti-Islamic and the scriptures used by militant outfits are based on 
misinterpretations of Islam. The anti-militancy and counterterrorism programs of the Ministry 
of Religious Affairs (MoRA) during 2010-2012, and 2014-2015 included the publication and 
distribution of leaflets, books, documentary films and audio-video (220,000 copies in 2010-
2012), and the organization of seminars, conferences, trainings, and discussion meetings with 
the mosque Imams, religious leaders, and social elites (200,5 in 2010-2012, 1122 seminar and 
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khutba discussions (Friday pre-sermon) at mosques to raise awareness about and counter 
militancy and terrorism in the country. The information ministry has developed short-films to 
create mass awareness about militancy.  
The Awami League Government boldly promised to continue the campaign in 2009 
following the caretaker government (CTG) that launched a nation-wide socio-political 
campaign involving religious leaders, teachers, students and local administration against the 
militancy during 2007-2008 (Islam, 2015; Rahman, & Kashem, 2011). The campaign of the 
CTG included anti-militancy sermons in mosques and statements at schools, screening plays 
and documentaries on TV and in public places to raise public awareness about the ills of 
militancy and extremism. The CTG implemented a grassroots de-radicalization program in 
three regions --- Cox’s Bazar, Bogra, and Sylhet through creating new non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) along with enforcement interventions in terms of proscribing outfits, 
arresting and prosecuting militants (Fink, & El-Said, 2011; Rahman & Kashem, 2011).  
The CTG’s de-radicalization program was both reactive and preemptive in nature, 
hence it was described as a hybrid of counter-radicalization and de-radicalization programs 
(Fink, & El-Said, 2011; Harrigan, 2011). This government initiative targeted already 
radicalized individuals and vulnerable communities through interactive workshops, seminars, 
and conferences in village madrassas, and mosques with local people bringing imams, 
religious leaders, and influential figures from outside the project areas to deliver the accurate 
narrative of Islam and its relationship to peace, modernity, human rights, democracy and the 
role of religious leaders. Under this program, NGOs offered loans to some bright madrassa 
graduates for establishing small enterprises. Some graduates were offered vocational training 
opportunities. Some families of convicted violent extremists were offered financial assistant 
to educate their children to prevent the militant group’s involvement (Fink, & El-Said, 2011).  
However, this counter-radicalization program did not focus specifically on the 
rehabilitation of detainees. Media and researchers reported that some of the convicts or 
detainees held on terrorism or militancy charges were engaged in radicalizing other prisoners 
inside jails, and maintained relationships with their militant groups and mentors. Released 
prisoners were likely to become recidivists because of the jail environment, which lacks 
counseling, educational, recreational programs and includes rampant mismanagement linked 
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terrorist prisoners upon release were found to have become involved in serious militant 
attacks. Given the issues of jail environment, and the risk factors for disaffection, appropriate 
prison-based de-radicalization and rehabilitation programs need to be in pace as well. 
El-Said, and Harrigan (2011) argue the counter-radicalization strategies undertaken by 
the caretaker government were very effective. These grass-roots counter-radicalization, de-
radicalization or disengagement programs targeted already radicalized and vulnerable 
communities. Bangladesh’s approach to combine both law enforcement-centric and soft 
counter violent extremism strategy is thus a hybrid between counter-radicalization and de-
radicalization (Harrigan, 2011). Despite appreciations by local and external observers, this 
grassroots program was not sustained or expanded into the future. 
Implications for Counter-Radicalization 
Of the 160 million people in Bangladesh 88.8 precent are Muslims, and relatively few, 
as can be estimated from the number of militants arrested, and the number of members of 
those banned militant organizations presented earlier, are engaged in militancy or have 
become radicalized (Rahman, & Kashem, 2011; El-Said, & Harrigan, 2011; Riaz, 2016a). 
This paper argues that the government is successful in combatting terrorism because of its law 
enforcement centric counter-terrorism measures; yet, the root causes of radicalization and the 
risk factors for the rise of violent extremists have remained largely unexplored, and thus 
appropriate counter-radicalization strategies are not in place. Below are highlighted some 
political interventions, and youth interventions, that must also encompass religious 
interventions and educational interventions. 
Youth Interventions 
This paper argues that, given the vulnerability of the young population to 
radicalization, the role of education system and civil society can be effective in countering 
radicalization among the Bangladeshi youths. The sites of intervention thus go beyond 
schools, madrassas, and mosques.  El-Said ad Harrigan (2011) point out the importance of 
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well as the local culture and context for the success of counter-radicalization programs in 
Muslim-majority states. 
More than half of the total Bangladeshi population is below 24 years of age (BBS, 
2011). More than 30 percent of the total population (about 48 million) is young (10-24 years) 
(UNFPA, 2014). Millions of these individuals are in schools, colleges, universities, and 
madrassas. As discussed earlier, the extremist groups are now targeting and attracting the 
middle class, educated and influential people including those in the public and private 
universities and professions (BEI, 2014). The Internet (social media platforms), leaflets, cell 
phones, and other traditional means of communications facilitated the process of 
radicalization among the young people. Youth are the group most vulnerable to the radicalism 
appeal of militant groups who use radical and extremist narratives that grossly misinterpret 
religion (BEI, 2015). The government should undertake programs such as counseling, 
awareness-raising, life skills training and income generating activities to intervene with 
madrassa students, Rohinga refugees and others who are already exposed or vulnerable to 
Islamist radicalization and extremism. 
 
Educational Interventions for Youth 
 
Bangladesh is the second largest home for madrassas (registered) after Indonesia (BEI, 
2011). Bangladesh has 37,000 madrassas (both Aliya and Qaumi) with 3340,800 students and 
230,732 teachers (BEI, 2011). Another estimates indicate that so far Bangladesh has 16,000 
(6,800 primary, and 9,200 post-primary) Aliya madrassas, and so far 48,000 Qaumi madrasas. 
Qaumi madrasas that impart pre-primary to post-graduate level Islamic education and are 
privately funded and remain outside government control (BEI, 2009). Aliya (from elementary 
to postgraduate level) madrassas are state regulated and funded by both state and private 
sector. Given the size of the madrasa sector, and the potential risk for breeding Islamic 
radicalism in these institutions, counter-radicalization strategies must focus on the madrasa 
curriculum, quality of teachers, and pedagogy. In some madrassas, teaching of hatred toward 
other religions and Western values is practiced (BEI, 2015). As discussed earlier, the 
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finding no job are likely to motivate madrassa students to become radicalized and get 
involved in militancy and terrorism. 
The madrasa stream must be regulated by the government and integrated with the 
general and vocational streams. The anti-madrasa policy is not effective. El-Said and Harrigan 
(2011) argue that local context, i.e., the culture and traditions must be considered to make 
counter-radicalization strategies successful. Madrasa education system has been here for 
centuries, and cannot be considered breeding grounds for Islamic radicalization. Only 19 
percent of arrestees in connection with militancy were found students of madrasas (Sobhan, 
2009). Instead of scapegoating madrasas for producing militants or radicals, or profiling 
madrasa graduates, the traditional curriculum of madrassa needs to be revised, as discussed 
earlier, in order to produce graduates with similar academic strengths of the graduates from 
the general stream.  
The government has undertaken the National Education Policy in 2010, and it is under 
implementation. It is also found that poverty, access to mainstream schools, and rural areas 
are associated with those madrassas where the quality of teaching and learning is problematic 
(BEI, 2011). Many poor families want to send their kids to mainstream schools, but they do 
not have access to those schools in their locality. The government needs to establish 
mainstream schools in needy rural and remote areas so that school-age children get education 
as per their desire. As envisioned in the National Education Policy 2010, the different 
education streams (madrassa and general) can be integrated by creating a uniform curricula 
and syllabus so that the madrasa graduates can be equally competitive in the job market with 
their counterparts. Religious and ethics course (moral education) need to be introduced, and 
the quality of teaching and pedagogical learning, needs to be improved. Above all, the 
education policy must be implemented transparently in consultation with all stakeholders.  
 
Religious Interventions for Youth 
 
In Bangladesh, teachers, Imams, religious leaders, the media, the local leaders and 
communities, and families can play significant roles in the prevention of radicalization among 
the young people in Bangladesh. Friday sermons and pre-sermon discussion at mosques, and 
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militancy and the evils of Islamist violent extremism. In some mosques during sermons, 
Imams deliver radical narratives and in some Qaumi madrassas, extremist ideologies are 
propagated, and militants’ trainings are carried out (Rahman, & Kashem, 2011; BEI, 2011, 
2015; Haque, 2006; Khan, 2006). Friday pre-khutba (sermon) and during sermons at 
mosques, Imams can discuss the topic of militancy, jihad, and how the radicalized groups 




Given the two major underlying issues as discussed above --- politics and vulnerable 
youth, some counterterrorism measures incorporating the issues of legal system, political 
culture, human rights protection, and criminal prosecution of militants and terrorist groups are 
discussed earlier. The national sociopolitical anti-militancy campaign and de-radicalization 
program as initiated by the last Caretaker Government (CTG) and later endorsed by the 
Awami League government must be implemented on a continuous basis given the fact that 
such counter-radicalization is a long-term endeavor. The initiatives undertaken by the 
education ministry, religious affairs ministry, and other ministries need to be properly 
implemented.  
The grassroots NGOs funded by government have been found successful in countering 
militancy and radicalism in Bangladesh (El Said, & Harrigan, 2011). Civil society 
organizations (CSOs) or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can mobilize the youth by 
providing counter-narrative (accurate interpretation of Islam) to the extremist narrative of the 
radical groups.  The potential role of civil society in countering radicalization lies in reaching 
out mass people at grassroots level and working with the government in Bangladesh by 
reducing the appeal of extremist groups and their messages through improving 
religious/political education and organizing diversionary activities for young people (BEI, 
2014). NGOs and CSOs can engage the youth in different socio-cultural activities and raise 
awareness through cultural festivals, dramas, plays, and documentaries to counter 
radicalization among the general people. The CSOs/NGOS can organize social, awareness 
raising, and advocacy campaigns and dialogues inviting recognized scholars, academics, and 
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Sunnah in this regard. They can publish accurate interpretations of Islam in the form of 
booklets, books, leaflets, posters, and CDs for dissemination and distribution among the 
Muslim youths, and the general public. 
The government can monitor terrorist financing or militancy through its NGO Affairs 
Bureau, Bangladesh Bank, and intelligence agencies. Families and local communities need to 
monitor if radical or extremist groups use any mosque, or madrassa for their recruitment, 
training, or motivational purposes, or if any teacher, imam or religious leader use radical 
narratives among the young people, students, or the general masses. The media, and the local 
government institutions can play significant role in raising public awareness against counter-
narratives of the radical groups. Above all, Imams, religious leaders, and teachers of madrasas 
need to be trained and equipped with logistics and resources so that that they preach or teach 
accurate messages of Islam to keep the young and general masses away from disaffected with 
violent extremist and radicalization. 
The government undertaking of counter-radicalization programs to address the 
underlying causes of the deeply rooted problem of Islamist militancy and violent extremism 
lacks sincerity as seen in their response to the attacks and murders since 2013 of university 
professors, writers, publishers, secular bloggers, gay rights activists, foreigners, policemen 
and members of religious minorities, including Shia and Sufi Muslims, Christians and Hindus 
by suspected militants. The current government has followed the hard approach like the 
previous governments. The hard approach, which includes the weeklong police drive, may be 
successful in catching the real killers, but in the long run might further complicate the 
problem of militancy as discussed above. Side by side police measures, and political reform, 
the government needs to launch concerted counter-radicalization and de-radicalization efforts 




Past and present Bangladeshi governments have been very serious about addressing 
the problem of militancy and terrorism since 2005, but they have flip-flopped on their position 
from denying the presence of Islamist militant groups to accepting them. A counterterrorism 
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in Bangladesh until 2013. But the coercive approach of law enforcement-centric means that 
utilize police, paramilitary forces and other law enforcement agencies alone seems to be 
inadequate. A comprehensive strategy should be undertaken to counter militancy, 
radicalization and extremism. The proper implementation of anti-militancy initiative 
undertaken by the education ministry, information ministry, and religious affairs ministry can 
be effective to counter-and de-radicalize the vulnerable young people as discussed in the 
paper.  
The exercise of political blaming between the two rivalry major political parties has 
continued till today. To address the root causes of violent extremism and radicalization, the 
political will among all political parties to not politicize the problem of militancy is a must. 
Politicians must become tolerant, and instead of blaming different political parties, should 
investigate the underlying causes of militancy and terrorism to address this problem 
effectively in Bangladesh.  
The government must not shrink the democratic space in mainstream politics. The 
ruling elites must not violate constitutional rights by stifling and suppressing the freedom of 
speech of those with different and opposing opinions. The law enforcement measures need to 
respect and protect human rights. The politicians must not create a political environment 
practicing violent political rhetoric and intolerance that can create an enabling environment 
for the extremists and militants to flourish in the context of multiple factors – domestic and 
external, religious, political and cultural as highlighted above.  
There is a significant need for empirical research into the causes, networks, and 
operations of militant and terrorist outfits as well as the radicalization processes of young 
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